15th January 2026 — Scientific and technological progress is recognised as a key driver for security, economic performance, and overcoming social challenges. States are increasingly developing strategic instruments to promote research, manage innovation, and simultaneously protect technological sovereignty. National and supranational lists of critical or sensitive technologies play a central role in this context.

These lists are intended to identify technologies of particular strategic importance and serve as a reference framework for policy-making, funding decisions, and security measures. At the same time, they are increasingly shaping the framework conditions for research and innovation activities of universities and research institutions.

No consensus on "critical"

A new publication by DLR Projektträger (DLR-PT) analyses and compares technology lists from six jurisdictions: the European Union, France, Canada, the Netherlands, Australia and the United States. Despite overlapping content, these lists differ considerably in terms of terminology, depth of detail, legal status, and target groups.

While some approaches are more security and protection-oriented, others primarily pursue industrial and innovation policy objectives. In some cases, both perspectives are combined. The analysis shows that the term"critical technologies" lacks a uniform definition and is interpreted and operationalised differently depending on the national context.

With a spotlight on safety, competition, and innovation, the analysed lists fulfil different functions. Some are designed to prevent knowledge leakage and control sensitive research activities, while others aim to strategically pool resources, strengthen national competitiveness, or align innovation ecosystems.

The degree of binding force also varies. While some lists are legally binding and establish concrete obligations for research organisations, others are purely advisory. These differences directly impact governance structures, cooperation decisions, and risk assessments undertaken by researchers.

Substantial overlaps, different emphases

Despite differing objectives, there are considerable thematic overlaps. Technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, biotechnology, robotics and energy technologies appear in almost all of the lists analysed. Differences arise primarily in the weighting of individual areas and in the treatment of defence and dual-use technologies.

The analysis also shows that many lists are deliberately broad in scope. This increases their political connectivity, but makes concrete operationalisation more challenging. Overly narrow definitions, by contrast, can create a misleading impression of precision and obscure relevant developments.

Lack of transparency in implementation and monitoring

A key finding concerns the implementation of technology lists. Despite their strategic importance, these lists are often not accompanied by straightforward implementation mechanisms for research stakeholders and are rarely linked to systematic, publicly comprehensible monitoring. Statements on how priorities affect funding decisions, cooperation patterns, or risk assessments are frequently absent.

As a result, there is a risk that technology lists become static reference points, without their actual impact being reviewed or further developed. To date, regular updates, clear evaluation criteria and transparent feedback into political and institutional decision-making processes have seldom been established.

Added value through comparative categorisation

The publication systematically summarises the various lists and renders them comparable. By applying a common technological classification, it reveals convergences and divergences that remain obscured in individual analyses.

This approach provides universities and research institutions with a sound basis for categorising their own research portfolios, cooperation strategies, and risk assessments in an international context. The analysis can therefore be understood as an orientation tool for reflective and differentiated research security governance and now forms the basis for the risk assessment approaches of the Safeguarding Science initiative of the DLR Projektträger.

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